Introduction
Our world is full of fictional devices that let people feel better about their situationthrough deception and self-deception. In large hotels, the floor right above the 12 th floor is labeled the 14 th floor. For those with an irrational fear of all things 13 th , this may give some consolation, though if there is any reasoning capacity left among those with such fears, certainly they must realize that the floor right above the 12 th is still the 13 th , whatever someone else may call it.
The legal realist, Felix Cohen, argued that law and legal reasoning is full of similarly dubious labels and bad reasoning, though of a special kind. He argued that judges, lawyers and legal commentators allow our own linguistic inventions and conventions to distort our thinking.
2 vast numbers of law students, and more than a few judges, into believing that there can be no binding contract if the two parties understood their transaction differently. In fact, the law is otherwise: where the parties sign the same written document, or assent to the same oral description of contractual terms, then the parties are bound (with small exceptions not presently important), even if they understood those terms differently.
In general, Holmes argues, the moralistic and property-laden language of contract law seems destined to give citizens the wrong ideas, even if the misleading of the public was not intended. When you tell your clients that they have a "valid contract," they think that they therefore have something real and substantial; and when you tell them that their valid contract was breached, they think that this means both that the law frowns on what the other party did, and that the other party will be subject to significant penalties (or at least that the innocent parties will be fully compensated).
However, as Holmes -and Karl Llewellyn, and other legal realists -have pointed out, all that a contractual right means is that some sum might be awarded in damages if the promised performance does not occur. 7 And I trust that all the students here have already learned enough contract law to know that many breaches of contract law will lead to only nominal pay-outseven less when one takes into account the significant legal fees one needs to pay to enforce one's so-called "right" in court, not to mention the long delays. It was Holmes who wanted us to sidestep the moralistic and metaphysical language, even the references to "right" and "duty," and explain instead -both to our law students and to our clients -that these terms mean nothing (can mean nothing) more than what a court will give you for them.
In contract law, as elsewhere, sometimes a court knows where it wants to go, and will not let mere doctrinal rules or the clear meaning of language get in its way. In the famous 1935 case of Webb v. McGowan, 8 an employee had saved his employer from death or grievous injury, by using his own body to push away a heavy falling object; in the process, the employee caused himself significant injury. In gratitude, the employer promised the employee regular payments until the employee died, and the employer kept that promise until his own death, at which point, his executor refused further payments. The employee sued to enforce the promise, but the problem was that under conventional contract law doctrine, then as now, for a promise to be enforceable, one needed consideration, something of value (or the promise of something of value) to have been given in return for the promise -and that exchange had to have been simultaneous with the promise, or after it. To have the benefit come beforehand does not suffice, at least under the general rule. 
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The words here do not mislead, so much as we feel the need to stretch the words to get around doctrinal rules we do not like. One can see this also for certain contractual requirements, requirements the law has created, or whose use it has authorized, for good reasons, but where there, nonetheless, are occasions when the law would rather not enforce them strictly. One excellent example is contractual conditions: "on/off" switches of the obligation to perform for one or both parties. Under American contract law, the courts will generally enforce the conditions expressly agreed to by the parties -except, of course, when they don't. And when they don't, the courts sometimes blame the party seeking enforcement. If that party acted in any way inconsistent with its rights under the condition, it is said to have "waived" that right. In fact, that action will often be described as a "knowing waiver."
But when the insurance company begins to investigate a claim that was in fact filed one day past the 30-day filing period, the courts may use that investigation as an excuse to enforce the rights of sympathetic policy holders, but it seems a mis-characterization, at least most of the time, to say that the insurance company "waived" its right to refuse payment based on the late filing. We may give it that description, but like the 14 th floor in the hotel, we are just trying to make the outcome look more attractive by using the wrong label. I speculate that saying that the insurance companies must have been trying to be generous, waiving its rights not to pay (but somehow changed its mind later, for otherwise we would not be in court) is more attractive, to all concerned, then saying that we do not much like the strict enforcement of deadlines, and we are at best suspicious of insurance companies, so that we will make a game out of contractual enforcement, and insurance companies that make any mis-steps will be penalized.
I do not want to make the courts, or contractual doctrine, appear to be too flexible or too sympathetic. There are many other occasions in which the courts are much more willing to enforce contractual terms, even against sympathetic consumers. There has been, for some years, heated debates about the proper approach to electronic contracting -the contracts associated with the sales of computers, and the leasing and downloading of computer software. With the sale of computers, the contractual terms are often packed into the box, so the purchaser often has no opportunity to see them until long after the goods have been ordered and paid for. (The courts tell us that we are supposed to read the terms at that point, and then return the merchandise if we disagree with any of the contractual provisions. 11 I am sure that there must be "Youtube" videos of the surprised and uncooperative looks of store clerks in big box stores when someone actually tries to follow the courts' advice.)
With downloaded software, the terms are sometimes displayed on a Web page that the person obtaining the software was already viewing; though, for some products, the terms are on some other Web page, that the person would have had to actively seek out. Sometimes the purchaser or lessor of the software needs to click a box indicating agreement to the terms before he or she can obtain the software, and other times the consumer's assent to all of the terms is simply assumed.
One basic question has been whether such transactions should be analyzed under the common law of contracts, under the Uniform Commercial Code (UCC) articles that apply to the sale and lease of goods, under some entirely new set of standards, or some combination of the three.
Some years back, the American Law Institute, together with the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL) attempted to amend the Uniform
Commercial Code, either through additions to Article 2 on the Sale of Goods, or through an entirely new article to the UCC, to deal with these sorts of transactions.
There was significant opinion that the new standards regulating electronic contracting should include procedural and substantive restrictions on the terms that could be imposed on those who purchased computers or downloaded software, especially in contexts where the terms were only given in the box to be shipped later or hidden on a Web site in a non-conspicuous way.
The vendors of computers and computer software were not happy about this development, and, through legal representatives and sympathetic (and compensated) law professors, complained that the proposed restrictions would interfere with the "freedom of contract" of both the vendors and the users of the computers and computer software.
In a world where contracts are often long, intricate, and cryptic, on standardized forms not subject to negotiation or re-negotiation, and given on a "take it or leave it basis," where there may be little choice but to work with this vendor, or where all vendors offer identical terms; and where sometimes transactions occur in ways such that one of the parties may be unlikely to know that there even are binding and restrictive contractual terms, and even less chance of understanding them correctly if they were brought to his or her attention: in such situations, it is an interesting question whether there is "freedom of contract" at all, and whether there is any "consent" or "assent" to the terms, in any meaningful sense of those terms.
It is like the question of whether there was meaningful "freedom of contract" for the bakers and other workers in Lochner v. New York 12 and the related cases in the early decades of the 20 th century. In those cases, constitutional challenges were brought against legislation purporting to protect workers. Those challenging the statutes claimed that the laws unconstitutionally infringed the workers' "freedom of contract," their freedom to enter agreements to labor particularly long hours, for particularly low wages, and in doubtful working conditions.
My rhetorical excess aside, I really do mean to say that it is an interesting question whether "freedom of contract" is present, in a morally significant sense, either for the users of software in so-called "clickware" and "browseware" transactions and other forms of electronic contracting, or for the workers who were the subject of paternalistic legislation. One can understand the argument that bakers can sometimes reasonably and autonomously choose to work longer hours, even at a low rate and in poor conditions, and one can understand an argument that people sometimes rationally choose to remain ignorant of the terms that bind them contractually, believing that they can trust the companies with whom they are dealing, and that they think learning about the terms that bind them would take time that could be better spent on other concerns.
At the same time, for many consumers --perhaps most consumers --what goes on in the acquisition of computer hardware and software is at most a caricature of free and knowing assent to terms, analogous to the caricature of voting that occurs when there are "elections" in totalitarian, one-party states. 13 And when we pretend that consumers' inaction in responding to long boilerplate clauses sent in the box, or hidden in a web site, is the same --or should be treated the same --as two sophisticated parties negotiating out each significant term of an agreement, we are fooling ourselves … or at least allowing ourselves to be fooled.
You can call it "consent," you can call it "freedom of contract," but most of the time, I
think it is just the 13 th floor. objective quality-of-life judgment -or else the court is hoping for a level of mental acuity and flexibility among judges and guardians never seen this side of the string theory physicisists who speak confidently of 10 dimensions of space.
There are many reasons to favor protecting the autonomous choices of contracting parties and medical patients, but sometimes autonomous choice -consent -is simply not present, or present in such a weak or distorted form that it cannot carry the moral weight that it usually demanded of it. And we need simply to admit that, to be honest about that, and choose both another word, and another sort of justification.
Family Law
In time, we have learned the power of mere labels. Perhaps the sensitivity to names, and the power they can have, is greatest in family law. For example, when we divide up the care of children after divorce, it was, and still is, common to divide up the care unevenly: for children to stay much of the week in one parent's house, and only the weekend, or every other weekend, in the other parent's house. The further away from each other the two parents live, the more there is a necessity for a sharply split, and uneven division of the children's physical presence: when the parents live very far apart, the children may spend the entire school year with one parent, seeing the other only for the summer and perhaps a holiday or two. As stated, the practicality of long-distance travel plus the requirements of schooling makes this uneven division inevitable where the parents live far apart. (And even when they do not live far apart, some experts claim that children do better with more continuity and not too much shuttling back and forth between parents, though this position is controversial.)
Where there is an uneven division of the physical custody of children, for a long time we called the parent with most of the time, the "custodial parent," while the other parent was said to have "visitation" rights. Not that many years ago, it occurred to some commentators and lawmakers that being the "visitor" with one's own children might not be a description that encouraged connection and good feeling, so that a number of jurisdictions (including Minnesota)
have generally switched to referring to "parenting plans" rather than "custodial parent" and "visitation."
A game of names with even larger stakes is happening all over this country, relating to the legal recognition of same-sex unions. To a significant portion of the population, to give same-sex couples the ability to enter civil marriage is a horrible thing, but to give them exactly the same set of rights and obligations under a different name is "just fine, thank you." Of course, one might note that the strangeness runs in both directions. California had already granted same-sex couples all the same state-law rights and obligations as opposite-sex married couples under the rubric of "domestic partnerships." However, gay rights advocates went to the California Supreme Court to seekand, temporarily, to obtain -the right for same-sex couples to marry. 22 That right was subsequently removed by a state referendum ("Proposition 8"). And just today, the Vermont Legislature, overriding the veto of its Governor, voted to allow same-sex couples to marry, changing only the title for a set of rights and duties that same-sex couples had already had in that state for 9 years under the label, "civil unions." These are just further examples of both sides of the debate fighting over labels. It is not precisely that nothing mundane and practical is at stake, but it is so little (where the federal government will not recognize the unions as marriages, and no other state will do so either, except perhaps New Hampshire, New York, and the District of Columbia) that it hardly grounds or explains the strong feelings on both sides.
Here it is perceptions that make it so. Because both opponents and supporters treat samesex "marriage" as significantly different from, and significantly better than, any recognized status for same-sex couples under a different name, then it is the case. Same-sex couples who can enter "civil unions" or "domestic partnerships," but not "marriage," perceive such unions, not as "separate but equal," but as being relegated to "second class status," even if there is no legal differences as a matter of state law. And it seems likely that some significant percentage of heterosexuals think so as well, or it would be hard to explain the wide differential in the opinion polls. Of course, here, it is not so much that words mislead us as it is that we let words stand in for differing attitudes towards certain non-traditional ways of living.
Words also have significance when we move from the rules about entering marriage to those relating it its exit. Considering that it is a long-standing and pervasive aspect of the law of marriage and divorce, alimony (also called "spousal maintenance" or "spousal support") is thoroughly under-theorized. It is the historical residue of a time, hundreds of years back, when the vast majority of women had no practical means of supporting themselves in the Market. At that time, adult women went from having been the financial dependents of their fathers to being the financial dependents of their husbands. Divorce back then was either very rare or entirely forbidden.
When a movement arose to make divorce more easily accessible -if only on fault grounds to the innocent and wronged spouse -one practical necessity was to create some provision for the wives (at least the innocent ones). Otherwise, divorce would leave wives destitute. And the awkward compromise that was reached was that when a divorce occurred, though the marriage was dissolved, the husband's obligation to support his wife would continue, and this would be called "alimony." That obligation would end, however, if the wife found another husband -and thus, the long-standing rule, still valid in many states, that alimony terminates automatically upon remarriage. As the father "gives the bride in marriage" to her first husband, so the first husband, in a sense, gives the woman away to her second husband, at least in terms of financial duty.
Time passed, and alimony, this residue of a former historical period, continued, even if only granted in a fraction of divorces. However, a new justification was sought. Many courts began to speak of alimony being appropriate where, and to the extent that, the spouse (almost always the wife) could prove "need."
This is the terminology and rhetoric that one finds in a large proportion of alimony cases to this very day. However, in a vast majority of those cases, "need" is not used in a conventional way. The court does not inquire as to whether a spouse has been left without the means to meet even basic minimal requirements of life -though that would usually justify alimony (if only to prevent the State from having to support that spouse; family law doctrine is generally protective of the public fisc).
When the courts speak of spousal "need" in alimony case, the reference is often, indirectly, to the standard of living within the marriage. A long-term spouse is basically held to have a right to something like the quality of life she or he enjoyed during the marriage, and may receive alimony if that spouse's income-earning capacity will not rise to that level after the marriage is over. However, again, courts rarely venture to articulate why spouses in long-term marriages should be thought to have such rights.
Because "need" is used in alimony cases in a way that sharply differs from the conventional meaning of that term (references to spouses "needing" $100,000 rankles almost as much as certain corporate bailout bonuses, and NBA star Latrell Sprewell's comment 23 that he was rejecting a contract offer of $27 million over 3 years because he needed to "feed his 23 Made on or just before November 2, 2004.
family"), and because courts have generally failed to offer a coherent justification for alimonywith or without reference to "need" -it is perhaps not surprising that legal doctrine and practice are chipping away at alimony. At least one state, Texas, does not allow permanent alimony (except where the recipient or a dependent child is mentally or physically disabled), and places strict time and dollar constraints on what the courts can award. Also, many states, by legislation or court practice, have moved from preferring permanent (that is, indefinite) alimony, to preferring temporary (or "rehabilitative" alimony). We understand the description "rehabilitate"
in the context of alimony -give the spouse the time and resources needed to retrain and re-enter the workforce -better than we understand the word "need."
Some commentators, and the American Law Institute -through its Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution 24 -have in the last few years tried to establish a more sensible grounding for alimony. Alimony is presented as an entitlement a spouse in a long-term marriage earns based on sacrifices that spouse made giving up a career, staying home to take care of house and family, and so on, sacrifices that meant both that this spouse lost earning capacity, and that the sacrifices made helped the other spouse increase his or her earning capacity. With that understanding, suddenly alimony is an entitlement rather than charity, we no longer have to stretch the word "need" to cover middle class and upper class standard of living payments, andby the way -there is no reason to have alimony terminate automatically upon the recipient's remarriage.
Perhaps if we followed the ALI, and started speaking of alimony in terms of what a spouse has "earned," rather than "charity" given to meet spousal "needs," there would also be less felt pressure to reduce the frequency, length, and amounts given in those awards. Not that every marriage and divorce should include alimony, but for longer marriages where one spouse has sacrificed significantly, the claim should not be quickly dismissed.
As we leave the rights and duties between spouses and ex-spouses in family law and look at parent-child rules, the standard heard often -indeed, constantly -is "best interests of the child." It is almost a laugh line: for any family law question in a course exam or the bar examination, one will rarely go far wrong to simply say, "best interests of the child," whatever the actual questions inquired. And perhaps this is the problem: "best interests of the child" is so familiar, so well rehearsed, and so politically palatable (it is not a coincidence that debates about same-sex marriage end up turning into arguments about the best context in which to raise children, although this is largely tangential to the subject).
Like "consent" in electronic contracting, "subjective choice" in medical decision-making, and "waiver" in insurance contracts, we say "best interests of the child" even when we do not mean it, because we like the way it sounds.
When courts say that parents should be given a very strong presumption in any custody fight with non-parents, when we say that grandparents and same-sex partners who have helped to raise a child have no standing even to request visitation, when we say that a very strong showing of harm will be required to cut off an even quite bad parent from visitation rights, and when we say that as a matter of public policy we will not consider as a factor in a custody decision whether a child will be placed in child care or whether a child might face harsh discriminatory feelings in a community, these are all decisions that courts often defend in terms of "the best interests of the child."
I should add that I think that many of these decisions (though not all of them) are right, or at least reasonable choices between equally good and equally bad options. However, I think
